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Academic Freedom, Job Security,
and Costs
Richard K. Neumann Jr.
Claims are sometimes made that academic job security—whether tenure
or another type required by accreditation—is not needed to protect academic
freedom, and that job security imposes unnecessary costs. This article explains
why those claims are false.
1. Job Security Is Essential to Academic Freedom
Our concept of a university originated in Germany in the late nineteenth
century and arrived in the United States when American academics returned
from study abroad, importing the idea of a university as a center for both
learning and research protected by academic freedom.1 German universities
recognized academic freedom in two forms: Lernfreiheit, the student’s freedom
to learn, and Lehrfreiheit, the teacher’s freedom “to examine bodies of evidence
and to report his ﬁndings in lecture or published form,” or in other words
“freedom of teaching and freedom of inquiry.”2
Inevitably, conﬂict ensued. American faculty members were vulnerable to
powerful business interests, trustees, and donors who might be oﬀended by
unconstrained teaching and research. “Over and over again the same pattern
repeated itself: an academic publicly urged reforms or criticized the existing
social order and was then summarily dismissed for his trouble.”3
The most notorious incident was Stanford University’s dismissal of
the economist Edward A. Ross—not for his scholarship, but instead for his
politics. Among other things, Ross had supported Eugene V. Debs, the labor
leader who had been convicted for defying a federal injunction during the
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RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WILLIAM P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
IN THE UNITED STATES 367–412 (1955). The oldest European universities (Bologna and Paris)
date from the eleventh century, but our model is the nineteenth-century German model.

2.

Id. at 386–87.

3.

CHRISTOPHER J. LUCAS, AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A HISTORY 202 (2006). The history,
including the AAUP’s founding, are well described in two classic works: HOFSTADTER &
METZGER, supra note 1, and FREEDOM AND TENURE IN THE ACADEMY (William W. Van Alstyne
ed., 1993).
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1894 Pullman Strike4 and who later ran for President ﬁve times on the Socialist
Party ticket. Stanford had no board of trustees. It instead had one trustee, Jane
Lothrop Stanford, who was Leland Stanford’s widow. Leland Stanford, who
died in 1893, had accumulated his fortune building and operating railroads,
which he constructed by underpaying Asian laborers who had been imported
for the purpose. In 1900 Ross made oﬀ-campus speeches arguing, in part, that
importation of labor should be illegal and that railroads should be owned by
government and operated for the public good. The university’s sole trustee
demanded that he be dismissed, and he was, through a forced resignation. The
chair of the history department was ﬁred after he protested what had happened
to Ross. Seven other members of the Stanford faculty resigned in protest.
This and many other incidents led to the creation of the American Association
of University Professors in 1915. Its ﬁrst President was John Dewey, who is still
considered a leading ﬁgure in philosophy and educational psychology. He was
an education reformist, and, out of solidarity with K-12 teachers, he joined
the American Federation of Teachers. Immediately he appointed an AAUP
committee of ﬁfteen academics, including Roscoe Pound, dean of the Harvard
Law School,5 to draft the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom
and Academic Tenure.
Eight of the ﬁfteen had studied in German universities,6 and the Declaration’s
ﬁrst sentence refers, using the German terminology, to both Lernfreiheit, the
student’s academic freedom, and to Lehrfreiheit, the teacher’s academic freedom.
But having acknowledged the former, the Declaration concentrated exclusively
on the latter,7 which it divided into “freedom of inquiry and research; freedom
of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of [extramural]
4.

Aﬃrmed by a unanimous Supreme Court. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). A later conviction,
for giving a speech opposing U.S. participation in World War I, was aﬃrmed by the
Supreme Court in an opinion by Holmes. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). While
imprisoned in the Atlanta Penitentiary, Debs ran for President one last time and received
almost a million votes.

5.

Pound’s ﬁngerprints are on the Declaration’s assertion that “the relationship of professor to
trustees may be compared to that between judges of the Federal courts and the Executive
who appoints them. University teachers should be understood to be, with respect to the
conclusions reached and expressed by them, no more subject to the control of the trustees,
than are judges subject to the control of the President . . . .” AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE 12 (1915)
[hereinafter 1915 AAUP Declaration].

6.

HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 1, at 396.

7.

Although U.S. courts do not use the German term Lernfreiheit or even the phrase student
academic freedom, the concept is alive and well in American case law adjudicating the rights
and obligations of tenured faculty. In the reported cases in which a teacher sued after tenure
was revoked for behavior that made it substantially harder for students to learn, the teacher
almost always lost in court. For example, see the cases in notes 28 and 30 as well as Tarasenko
v. Univ. of Ark., 63 F. Supp. 3d 910 (E.D. Ark. 2014). The exceptions typically involve internal
procedures rather than the facts on the merits. See note 18. As far as the law is concerned,
student academic freedom outranks faculty academic freedom.
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utterance and action.”8 In later years, a consensus within the academy has
added a fourth: freedom of intramural utterance and action, which means the
freedom both to participate in governance and to comment within a school on
how it is administered, all without fear of retribution.
The Declaration is perhaps the most eloquent and passionate justiﬁcation for
academic freedom and academic job security. In its twenty-three pages are the
following:
The responsibility of the university teacher is primarily to the public itself,
and to the judgment of his own profession; and while, with respect to
certain external conditions of his vocation, he accepts a responsibility to
the authorities of the institution in which he serves, in the essentials of his
professional activity his duty is to the wider public to which the institution
itself is morally amenable . . . .9
It is scarcely open to question that freedom of utterance is as important to the
teacher as it is to the investigator. [No one] can be a successful teacher unless
he enjoys the respect of his students, and their conﬁdence in his intellectual
integrity. It is clear, however, that this conﬁdence will be impaired if there is
suspicion on the part of the student that the teacher is not expressing himself
fully or frankly . . . . It is not only the character of the instruction but also the
character of the instructor that counts; and if the student has reason to believe
that the instructor is not true to himself, the virtue of the instruction as an
educative force is incalculably diminished. There must be in the mind of the
teacher no mental reservation.10

In that same year the AAUP created its Committee A, which in the century
following has investigated and reported countless violations of academic
freedom. Its ﬁrst case involved the University of Utah’s ﬁring of teachers for
comments made in class and for expressing—in private—unfavorable views of
the university’s administration.
Of the dozens of faculty ﬁred before and around the time of the Declaration,
none had any form of the job security other than, at best, one-year contracts.
The 1915 Declaration stated the faculty argument for academic freedom and
job security. But for practical purposes the AAUP needed a less passionate
document that colleges and universities might be willing to adopt as institutional
policy. It negotiated with the Association of American Colleges to produce the
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure. That document has been
adopted as policy by the overwhelming majority of American universities.
The 1915 Declaration expresses the policy behind academic freedom. The 1940
Statement expresses some but not all of the rules.
8.

1915 AAUP Declaration, supra note 5, at 6.

9.

Id. at 12.

10.

Id. at 14.
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2. Job Security Promotes Innovation
In addition to protecting academic freedom, job security has been shown
by empirical research to increase innovation and creative problem-solving—
especially among highly educated employees such as J.D. faculty. The converse
has also been shown empirically: People who can easily lose their jobs will not
innovate because they cannot aﬀord the risk.
The leading researcher on workplace creativity describes a study of
“scientists working in research organizations . . . . [with] doctorates or master’s
degrees”:
Four social-psychological factors seemed most important in facilitating the
realization of creative potential: (1) high responsibility for initiating new
activities, (2) high degree of power to hire research assistants, (3) no interference
from [an] administrative superior, and (4) high stability of employment.11

In laboratory and other sciences, research assistants are essential in ways that
are barely relevant to law faculty. But the rest of this list—and especially the last
item—replicates what happens in law schools. One study found:
[E]mployees who fear that they might be laid oﬀ may be more likely to try to
avoid any behavior that would increase the likelihood of losing their positions.
. . . The possibility that the threat of losing one’s job may have a negative
impact on creative problem-solving is provocative. Our results demonstrate
that this is the case. . . .12

According to another study:
Two key features of job roles may be important for ultimately realizing
creativity in the workplace, speciﬁcally, a challenging job and freedom. When
these are provided by the organization, employees are motivated to . . . attempt
new approaches and ideas, even if they involve risk of failure.13

And still another one:
The ﬁndings involving . . . resistance to change are consistent across studies. . . .
The positive correlation between job insecurity and resistance to change also
is of interest because it . . . appears to contradict rational behavior.”14
11.

TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT 210–11 (1996) (emphasis added).

12.

Tahira M. Probst, Susan M. Stewart, Melissa L. Gruys & Bradley W. Tierney, Productivity,
Counterproductivity and Creativity: The Ups and Downs of Job Security, 80 J. OCCUPATIONAL &
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 479, 483, 491 (2007).

13.

Ravit Cohen-Meitar & Abraham Carmeli, Linking Meaningfulness in the Workplace to Employee
Creativity: The Intervening Role of Organizational Identiﬁcation and Positive Psychological Experiences, 21
CREATIVITY RES. J. 361, 371 (2009).

14.

Leonard Greenhalgh & Zehava Rosenblatt, Job Insecurity: Toward Conceptual Clarity, 9 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 438, 443 (1984).
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3. Tenure Per Se Does Not Impose Significant Costs
Tenure is not lifetime employment,15 which even the AAUP concedes.16
Tenure is a contract for indeﬁnite employment, which can be terminated by
the school, following speciﬁed procedures, whenever there is cause or ﬁnancial
exigency. Through its power to make institutional policy, the school can deﬁne
cause17 and can determine the procedures.18
If the employer is a public institution, tenure can be contractual, but it is
also subject to state statutes and involves constitutionally protected property
rights19 as well as contract rights. A statute might deﬁne cause and ﬁnancial
exigency, and it might set out tenure-revocation procedures. If there is no
statute, the school decides, through its internal policies, the meaning of cause
and the nature of the procedures. Either way, procedures for public institutions
must meet due process requirements.
As explained below, the tests for cause and for ﬁnancial exigency are
easier to satisfy than faculty members might imagine. In the reported cases on
tenure revocation, the dismissed faculty member rarely wins in court.
The tenure contract is not usually expressed in a single, integrated writing
executed by both parties. Instead the contract incorporates the school’s
regulations and personnel policies as well as any agreements directly between
the school and the faculty member.20 The school is free to change the relevant
regulations and policies, and the tenure contract is automatically revised to
incorporate the changes. A faculty member who continues to work at the
school is deemed to have agreed to those changes. Throughout contract law,
15.

STEVEN G. POSKANZER, HIGHER EDUCATION LAW: THE FACULTY 208 (2002).

16.

A former AAUP president wrote in the AAUP’s own journal that tenure “lays no claim
whatever to a guarantee of lifetime employment.” William Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary,
Explanation, and “Defense,” 57 AAUP BULL. 328, 328 (1971).

17.

If the school’s policy documents use the word cause without specifying its meaning, courts
enforce the meaning found in other schools’ policy documents or in the case law, which
contract law categorizes as trade usage or industry practice. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 203 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).

18.

Even where the school initially does not follow its internal procedures, the faculty member
will still be dismissed as long as the school is eventually able to prove cause or ﬁnancial
exigency. If a court rules for the faculty member on the internal procedural error, the school
simply redoes the internal process, after which a court will rule for the school on the merits,
or the parties will settle privately. For example, Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 689 F.3d
558 (6th Cir. 2012).

19.

Because the due process clause does not protect contract rights, courts will accept an
argument that tenure is a property right, but only for the purpose of adjudicating federal
due process claims involving public universities. In those cases, however, a state law contract
claim can usually be pleaded on the same facts.

20.

The tenure-revocation case law is ﬁlled with statements like this: “Plaintiﬀ’s contractual
relationship with the University appears to consist of only two documents: the Faculty Code
and the Faculty Handbook.” Saha v. George Wash. Univ., 577 F. Supp. 2d 439, 442 (D. D.C.
2008), aﬀ’d, 358 F. App’x 205 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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this is a familiar practice. Credit card companies amend our contracts the same
way, with the same eﬀect.
Tenure does not protect a faculty member’s salary. Nothing in the law of tenure
prevents reduction of a tenured faculty member’s salary.21 Courts hold that
“tenure by itself does not guarantee any particular salary level”22 and “no
college is required to perpetuate and even improve salaries or beneﬁts each
year, simply because the incumbent is tenured . . . .”23 To bring compensation
in line with value, a school can legally reduce the salary of an unproductive
faculty member, tenured or not. Medical schools began experiencing cost
crises in the 1990s, partially because federal funds became less freely available,
and began then in some instances to reduce salaries for nonproductivity.24 Law
schools have the legal authority to do the same thing.
Tenure does not protect other workplace beneﬁts. It does not guarantee assignment
to teach a faculty member’s favorite courses,25 or to keep an oﬃce the faculty
member has used for decades, or to be provided with resources such as research
assistants or travel funds.26 Tenure protects only a job. It does not guarantee
a good job. And it does not guarantee as good a job next year as the faculty
member had last year.
Tenure does not prevent a school from downsizing faculty. When a university has a bona
ﬁde ﬁnancial exigency, courts uniformly hold that a tenured faculty member
may be dismissed on that basis alone, regardless of how well the faculty
member is doing the job, with the sole condition that the school have acted in
good faith.27 A ﬁnancial exigency can be based entirely on enrollment declines
21.

See, e.g., Williams v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Sci. Ctr., 6 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 1993); Keen v.
Penson, 970 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1992); Chang v. Univ. of Toledo, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (N.D.
Ohio 2007); Tavoloni v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 26 F. Supp. 2d 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Univ.
of Miami v. Frank, 920 So.2d 81 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2006). The single reported contrary
case was decided for the plaintiﬀ only because his oﬀer letter had promised that throughout
his employment, he would be paid a salary computed according to a formula recited in the
letter—a rare situation in higher education and unheard of in law schools. Helpin v. Trs. of
the Univ. of Pa., 10 A.3d 267 (Pa. 2010).

22.

Conlay v. Baylor Coll. of Med., No. H–08–1038, 2010 WL 774162, ¶ 19 (S.D. Tex. 2010).

23.

Klinge v. Ithaca Coll., 634 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1995), aﬀ’d on other grounds, 652
N.Y.S.2d 377 (App. Div. 1997).

24.

See Sarah A. Bunton, The Relationship Between Tenure and Guaranteed Salary for U.S. Medical School
Faculty, ANALYSIS IN BRIEF, Apr. 2010, https://www.aamc.org/download/125190/data/
aibvol9_no6.pdf [https://perma.cc/G579-M944].

25.

See e.g., Cussler v. Univ. of Md., 430 F. Supp. 602, 608 (D. Md. 1977) (“[n]o faculty member
has a vested right in any course”); Sabinson v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 999 A.2d 380
(N.H. 2010) (same).

26.

Gertler v. Goodgold, 487 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567–68 (App. Div. 1985), aﬀ’d, 489 N.E.2d 748 (N.Y.
1985) (“[N]othing in the complaint or the record show[ed] that tenure guarantees a faculty
member any oﬃce at all, much less space of his own choosing.”).

27.

Even where an institution’s internal regulations and personnel policies do not explicitly
provide for terminations due to ﬁnancial exigency, courts have held that the power is
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or failure to meet enrollment projections.28 Even if the university as a whole
is ﬁnancially healthy, it can downsize a speciﬁc unit for declining enrollment
and can choose to dismiss tenured faculty members in that unit alone.29 Some
courts have even permitted institutions downsizing faculty to retain untenured
faculty members while discharging or furloughing tenured ones.30
Tenured faculty can be ﬁred for behavior that leads to ﬁring outside academia. A
school can terminate tenured faculty who do their jobs badly. This can
include inadequate teaching,31 inability to get along with co-workers,32 sex
implied in tenure contracts because “[t]he authority to terminate tenured faculty members
because of an economic crisis is an important tool to college administrators in maintaining
ﬁscal stability.” T. Michael Bolger & David D. Wilmoth, Dismissal of Tenured Faculty Members for
Reasons of Financial Exigency, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 347, 348 (1982).
28.

See, e.g., Bignall v. N. Idaho Coll., 538 F.2d 243, 249 (9th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents,
377 F. Supp. 227, 230, 235 (W.D. Wis. 1974); Graney v. Bd. of Regents, 286 N.W.2d 138, 145
(Wis. App. 1979).

29.

See, e.g., Krotkoﬀ v. Goucher Coll., 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978); Rose v. Elmhurst Coll., 379
N.E.2d 791, 794 (Ill. App. 1978); Scheuer v. Creighton Univ., 260 N.W.2d 595 (Neb. 1977).

30.

Brenna v. S. Colo. State Coll., 589 F.2d 475, 476–77 (10th Cir. 1978); Graham v. Columbia
Coll., 2012 WL 1098625 & 2012 WL 1072231 (D. S.C. 2012); Odynocki v. Southern Univ. at
New Orleans, 2006 WL 3230348 (E.D. La. 2006). But in some schools a collective bargaining
agreement might require that untenured faculty be dismissed before tenured faculty are.

31.

See, e.g., Agarwal v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 788 F.2d 504, 506 (8th Cir. 1986)
(“incompetent as a teacher, frequently harassing students and behaving in an unprofessional
manner toward colleagues”); King v. Univ. of Minn., 774 F.2d 224, 225 (8th Cir. 1985) (“poor
teaching performance, excessive unexcused absences from class, absences from faculty
meetings, low enrollment in his classes”); Potemra v. Ping, 462 F. Supp. 328, 330–31 (S.D.
Ohio 1978) (not responding to questions in class, criticizing students for asking questions,
behaving belligerently to students, giving failing grades vindictively, and refusing to attend
faculty meetings); Jawa v. Fayetteville State Univ., 426 F.Supp. 218. 224 (E.D. N.C. 1976) (“a
poor teacher . . . apparently unwilling to prepare for class; . . . diﬃculty interacting with . . .
[and] little interest in his students; . . . failed to keep oﬃce hours and to advise properly his
students”); Peterson v. N.D. Univ. Sys., 678 N.W.2d 163 (N.D. 2004) (revealing conﬁdential
information about a student to other students, ending a class a month before the semester
ended, and ignoring student questions and individual student requests for assistance);
Riggin v. Bd. of Trs., 489 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (teaching without adequate
preparation, habitually discussing irrelevant material in class, failing to cover material listed
in the school’s oﬃcial course description, canceling classes, and not keeping regular oﬃce
hours). But see Silva v. Univ. of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994) (“academic freedom
permits faculty members freedom to choose speciﬁc pedagogic techniques”) (italics added)
(quoting aﬃdavit of William Van Alstyne).

32.

See, e.g., Bowling v. Scott, 587 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1979) (“failed to perform his assigned
duties and committed acts inimical to the eﬃcient functioning of the Department of
English”); De Llano v. Berglund, 282 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2002) (repeatedly insulted
colleagues, made false accusations, and ﬁled frivolous job grievances); Sengupta v. Univ.
of Alaska, 21 P.3d 1240 (Alaska 2001) (treating colleagues and administrators in a dishonest,
abusive, and demeaning manner); Bernold v. Bd. of Governors, 683 S.E.2d 428, 431 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2009) (“interactions with colleagues had been so disruptive that the eﬀective and
eﬃcient operation of his department was impaired”); Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents, 863
S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tenn. 1993) (“[l]ack of professional behavior towards peers, administrators,
and staﬀ”).
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harassment,33 nonexistent or defective scholarship,34 and insubordination.35
Although academics might be surprised at the last item in that list, abundant
case law supports ﬁring tenured faculty for insubordination. Tenure does not
give a faculty member the power to refuse, for example, a directive to attend
graduation or an assignment to chair a heavy-workload faculty committee.
Academic freedom does not prevent university oﬃcials from managing their
organization, assigning tasks, or enforcing workplace rules.
Revocation of tenure isn’t the only available remedy. A university can
suspend a tenured faculty member without pay in an attempt to resolve a
personnel problem short of dismissal36 or as a last step before dismissal.37 And
it can reduce salary for the reasons explained above.
4. Job Security Under ABA Standard 405(c) Imposes No Significant Costs
Law schools are accredited by the American Bar Association—or more
speciﬁcally, the governing Council of the ABA Section of Legal Education
and Admissions to the Bar. The ABA’s Standards for Approval of Law
Schools require every school to have a system of tenure.38 For faculty outside
the conventional tenure system, the ABA requires other forms of job security.
33.

See, e.g., McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 1995); Levitt v. Univ. of Tex., 759 F.2d 1224
(5th Cir. 1985); Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504 (10th Cir. 1998); Traster v.
Ohio N. Univ., 2015 WL 10739302 (N.D. Ohio 2015); Haegert v. Univ. of Evansville, 977
N.E.2d 924 (Ind. 2012); Murphy v. Duquesne Univ., 777 A.2d 418 (Pa. 2001).

34.

See, e.g., Roberts v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 821 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2015) (plagiarism); Agarwal, 788
F.2d at 504 (plagiarism combined with poor teaching); King, 774 F.2d at 225 (“undocumented
research” combined with poor teaching); Riggin, 489 N.E.2d at 626 (“had not engaged in
research or scholarly activities for at least 10 years,” combined with poor teaching).

35.

See, e.g., McConnell v. Howard Univ., 818 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (refusing to teach a class
that included a student who had clashed with the professor); Shaw v. Bd. of Trs., 549 F.2d
929 (4th Cir. 1976) (refusing to attend a faculty workshop and refusing to participate in a
graduation ceremony); Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., (6th Cir. 2012) (refusing
to teach an assigned course); Smith v. Kent State Univ., 696 F.2d 476, 477 (6th Cir. 1983)
(refusing to teach a course because it would “lower his standing among the academic
community”); Garrett v. Mathews, 474 F.Supp. 594, 597 (N.D. Ala. 1979) (“failing to
supply a list of publications, failing to open mail from Dr. Hobby, and failing to post and
keep oﬃce hours”); Jawa, 426 F.Supp. at 224 (“uncooperative with his colleagues and the
administration; . . . unwilling or unable to follow . . . directives of his superiors and comply
with University policies and procedures”); Pollock v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. B145203, 2001
WL 1513870, *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2001) (refusing a teaching assignment); Heﬂin v.
Kansas City Kansas Cmty. Coll., 224 P.3d 1201 (Kan. 2010) (refusing to hold oﬃce hours at
a designated location); Josberger v. Univ. of Tenn., 706 S.W.2d 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985)
(refusing to perform assigned tasks).

36.

See, e.g., Wexley v. Mich. St. Univ., 25 F.3d 1052 (6th Cir. 1994); Tennyson v. Univ. of Minn.,
No. A07–1095, 2008 WL 2344257 (Minn. Ct. App. June 10, 2008); Mills v. W. Wash. Univ.,
246 P.3d 1254 (Wash. 2011).

37.

See, e.g., Murphy, 745 A.2d at 1228; Potemra v. Ping, 462 F. Supp. 328 (S.D. Ohio 1978).

38.

SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2015-2016, at 29 (Standard 405(b))
(2015) (“A law school shall have an established and announced policy with respect to
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Under ABA Standard 405(c):
A law school shall aﬀord to full-time clinical faculty members a form of security
of position reasonably similar to tenure, and non-compensatory perquisites
reasonably similar to those provided other full-time faculty members.39

This is supplemented by ABA Interpretation 405–6:
A form of security of position reasonably similar to tenure includes a separate
tenure track or a program of renewable long-term contracts. Under a separate
tenure track, a full-time clinical faculty member, after a probationary period
reasonably similar to that for other full-time faculty, may be granted tenure . .
. . For the purposes of this Interpretation, “long-term contract” means at least
a ﬁve-year contract that is presumptively renewable or other arrangement suﬃcient
to ensure academic freedom.40

(Interpretations are published with the Standards and are considered as
binding as the Standards.)
In the law of evidence, a presumption shifts or assigns a burden of proof
by presuming a conclusion of law.41 If a teacher has a Standard 405(c)
presumptively renewable contract, the teacher has a contractual right, when
that contract ends, to a new (renewed) contract of the same length unless the
school has admissible evidence suﬃcient to overcome the presumption that
the teacher satisﬁes the school’s renewal criteria, which the ABA requires every
school to establish.42 The teacher is not required to prove that she satisﬁes the
criteria. That is presumed. Instead the school must prove that she does not
satisfy them. For example, if the school’s written policy requires “excellence”
in teaching, and if that is the issue, the school must prove that the teacher’s
teaching is not “excellent.” If the school cannot prove that but nevertheless
fails to renew the contract, the school, as a matter of contract law, is liable
for breach of the expiring presumptively renewable contract. (The teacher’s
remedy is in court—not at the ABA.)
The ABA also requires a school to provide governance rights (and
responsibilities) to clinical faculty:

academic freedom and tenure . . . .”) [hereinafter 2015-16 ABA STANDARDS].
39.

Id. (Standard 405(c)).

40.

Id. (Interpretation 405–6 (italics added)).

41.

For example, the criminal presumption of innocence assigns to the government the burden
of proving guilt because, unless the government carries that burden, the law considers the
defendant innocent.

42.

2015-16 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 38, at 30 (Interpretation 405–7): “. . . A law school should
develop criteria for retention, promotion, and security of employment of full-time clinical
faculty.”
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“A law school shall aﬀord to full-time clinical faculty members participation
in faculty meetings, committees, and other aspects of law school governance
in a manner reasonably similar to other full-time faculty members.”43

Clinicians are the faculty members most likely to be attacked by outside
interests in exactly the kind of interference that led to creation of the AAUP
and its 1915 Declaration. Robert Kuehn and Peter Joy identiﬁed thirty-six
publicly known instances from 1968 to 2010 of interferences, or attempted
interferences, with clinicians’ academic freedom, by governors, government
agencies, legislatures, private industry, donors, alumni, and university
administrators and trustees.44 These thirty-six incidents are just the tip of an
iceberg. Most attacks on clinical academic freedom happen quietly and never
become public. In a 2005 survey, twelve percent of clinicians “reported similar
interference in their courses.”45
The ABA’s Standards do not deﬁne the term clinician, but in practice the
ABA appears to treat it as including both those who teach in client-based
clinics and those who teach skills in other settings, such as simulation courses.
A number of schools have provided legal writing faculty with 405(c) clinical
tenure or presumptively renewable contracts even though not required by the
ABA. (The ABA’s legal writing job security requirements, in Standard 405(d),
are less stringent than those in Standard 405(c).46)
Schools provide 405(c) job security to legal writing faculty for the same reason
they grant tenure to casebook teachers: to protect faculty academic freedom
and to gain the beneﬁts of each teacher’s capacity to innovate. Additionally, as
other articles in this volume explain, legal writing is an overwhelmingly female
ﬁeld, and a school that provides lesser forms of job security to its legal writing
faculty can create issues of sex discrimination regardless of whether the school
satisﬁes ABA requirements.
A number of legal writing teachers have described instances in which their
academic freedom has been compromised in ways that doctrinal faculty would
not tolerate in their own courses. These include requiring all the school’s
legal writing teachers to use identical syllabi, to grade each assignment in
speciﬁed ways, to give certain types of writing assignments, and to assign
certain textbooks, prohibiting other types of writing assignments and other
43.

Id. (Interpretation 405–8, which includes an exception for temporary teachers speciﬁed in
the last sentence of Standard 405(c)). Id. at 29 (Standard 405(c).
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2015–16 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 38, at 29 (Standard 405(d): “A law school shall aﬀord
legal writing teachers such security of position and other rights and privileges of faculty
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to provide legal writing instruction as required by Standard 303(a)(2), and (2) safeguard
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textbooks. These are violations of the academic freedom to teach as one thinks
best, which the 1915 Declaration eloquently describes, and they can extinguish
creativity and the capacity to innovate in the school’s legal writing program.
The Association of American Law Schools requires that member schools
guarantee as much academic freedom to skills and legal writing teachers as to
casebook faculty. Under AALS Executive Committee Regulation 4.2:
“Deﬁnition of Faculty. For purposes of this chapter, ‘faculty member’ means a
professional who is or was tenured, on the tenure track, or, although not on the
tenure track, engaged in teaching or scholarship, including work in a clinical or
research and writing program at a member school.”47

Under AALS Bylaw 6.6(d):
“A faculty member shall have academic freedom and tenure in accordance
with the principles of the American Association of University Professors.”48

An ABA committee summarized the AAUP documents as follows:
“Neither the 1915 Declaration nor the 1940 Statement says or implies that it
might be permissible to discriminate among ﬁelds of study by allocating more
academic freedom to some and less to others.”49

5. Conclusion
Job security—tenure or another form under ABA Standard 405(c)—is
essential to every full-time faculty member’s academic freedom.
Despite myths to the contrary, no form of job security inherently raises the
cost of education to any signiﬁcant degree. Nothing in academic employment
law prevents discharge, suspension, or salary reduction for a bad teacher, a
bad scholar, a disruptive colleague, or an insubordinate faculty member. Job
security does not protect salary or other workplace beneﬁts. And it does not
prevent faculty downsizing.
Because the law does not link salary to job security, a school can, without
increasing its annual budget, grant tenure-track protection to 405(c) and
405(d) faculty. Fairness and wisdom, however, should motivate a school to do
more by equalizing salaries as well as job security, and the other articles in this
volume eloquently explain why. This article shows that even if a school will
not equalize salary, it can still equalize job security.
Cost is no excuse.
47.
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